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Abstract
A new family of compromise solutions is introduced for the class
of compromise admissible games. These solutions extend bankruptcy
rules. It is shown that the compromise extension of the run-to-the-
bank rule coincides with the average of the extreme points of the core
cover (taking multiplicities into account) and that this solution is char-
acterised by means of a recursive formula.
Keywords: Bankruptcy, run to the bank rule, compromise admissible
games.
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1 Introduction
The model of bankruptcy situations as introduced by O’Neill (1982) is a
general framework for various kinds of simple allocation problems. In a
bankruptcy problem, there is an estate to be divided and each player has a
single claim on the estate. The total of the claims is larger than the estate
available, so one has to ﬁnd criteria on the basis of which the estate is to be
divided. In this context, many rules have been proposed to come to a fair
allocation of the estate. For a recent overview of such rules, the reader is
referred to Thomson (2003).
A bankruptcy situation can be seen as the most basic form of an allo-
cation problem. As a consequence, many bankruptcy rules have a straight-
forward interpretation and appropriate properties of such rules are easily
formulated. In a transferable utility game, the allocation problem is of a
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1more complicated nature: instead of each player having a single claim, each
coalition of players has a worth which has to be taken into account. Our
aim is to extend bankruptcy rules to the class of transferable utility games
in such a way that both the interpretation and the appealing properties are
maintained.
In this paper, we provide such an extension to the class of compromise
admissible (or quasi-balanced) games (cf. Tijs and Lipperts (1982)). Quant
et al. (2003) study the compromise extension of the Talmud rule for the
class of games for which the core coincides with the core cover. They prove
that for this class of games the compromise extension of the Talmud rule
coincides with the nucleolus. Gonz´ alez-D´ ıaz et al. (2003) introduce the
compromise extension of the adjusted proportional rule and show that this
solution coincides with the barycentre of the edges of the core cover. In the
current paper, we look at the problem of extending bankruptcy rules from
a more general viewpoint.
An important concept in the bankruptcy literature is duality (cf. Au-
mann and Maschler (1985)). We use this notion to deﬁne for each rule a
dual compromise extension and show that this solution coincides with the
compromise extension of the dual rule.
We pay particular attention to one speciﬁc solution: the compromise
extension of the run-to-the-bank-rule. We show that this solution is the
average of the extreme points of the core cover (taking multiplicities into
account) and characterise it by a recursive formula.
This paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we present some basic
deﬁnitions concerning transferable utility games and bankruptcy situations.
In section 3, we deﬁne the concept of compromise extension and analyse the
dual extension. Section 4 deals with the run-to-the-bank rule and shows
that this solution is the average of the extreme points of the core cover.
Finally, in section 5 we provide a recursive formula for the extension of the
run-to-the-bank rule.
2 Preliminaries
For two sets A;B we denote A ½ B if for all i 2 A we have i 2 B. For ﬁnite
A and two vectors x;y 2 RA we write x · y if xi · yi for all i 2 A.
A transferable utility game (in short TU game) is a pair (N;v), where
N denotes a ﬁnite set of players and v : 2N ! R is a function assigning to
each coalition S 2 2N a worth v(S). By convention v(;) = 0. The set of
2all TU games with player set N is denoted by TUN. Where no confusion
arises, we write v rather than (N;v).
Let v 2 TUN. The utopia demand of a player i 2 N, Mi(v) is deﬁned
by
Mi(v) = v(N) ¡ v(Nnfig):
The minimum right of a player i 2 N, mi(v), is the minimum value this
player can achieve by satisfying all other players in a coalition by giving










The core cover of a game v 2 TUN, CC(v), consists of all eﬃcient
allocation vectors, such that no player receives more than his utopia payoﬀ
or less than his minimum right:
CC(v) =
n
x 2 RN j
X
i2N
xi = v(N); m(v) · x · M(v)
o
:
A game is called compromise admissible if it has a nonempty core cover. The
class of all compromise admissible games with player set N is denoted by
CAN. From the deﬁnition of the core cover it immediately follows that v 2
CAN if and only if m(v) · M(v) and
P
i2N mi(v) · v(N) ·
P
i2N Mi(v).
The core cover is a polytope with at most jNj! extreme points. These
so-called larginal vectors are introduced in Quant et al. (2003) and have
been extensively studied in Gonz´ alez-D´ ıaz et al. (2003).
An order on N is a bijective function ¾ : f1;:::;jNjg ! N. The player
at position k in the order ¾ is denoted by ¾(k). The set of all orders on N
is denoted by Π(N). For ¾ 2 Π(N), the larginal `¾(v) is the eﬃcient payoﬀ
vector giving the ﬁrst players in ¾ their utopia demands as long as it is still
possible to satisfy the remaining players with their minimum rights.
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3for every k 2 f1;:::;jNjg.
It is readily seen that the core cover equals the convex hull of all larginals
CC(v) = conv
©
`¾(v) j ¾ 2 Π(N)
ª
:
An (one point) solution f on a subclass A ½ TUN is a function f : A ! RN
assigning to each game v 2 A a payoﬀ vector f(v) 2 RN. This paper intro-
duces a new type of allocation rule on CAN based on bankruptcy situations.
A bankruptcy situation is a triple (N;E;d), often abbreviated to (E;d).
N is a ﬁnite set of players, E ¸ 0 is the estate which has to be divided
among the players and d 2 RN
+ is a vector of claims, where for i 2 N, di
represents player i’s claim on the estate. It is assumed that the estate is not
large enough to satisfy all claims, so E ·
P
i2N di. We denote the class of
all bankruptcy situations with player set N by BRN.
A bankruptcy rule f is a function f : BRN ! RN
+ assigning to each
bankruptcy situation (E;d) 2 BRN a payoﬀ vector f(E;d) 2 RN
+, such that P
i2N fi(E;d) = E and f(E;d) · d.
One can associate a bankruptcy game vE;d 2 TUN with a bankruptcy
problem (E;d) 2 BRN. The worth of a coalition S is determined by the









This class of games is a proper subset of the class of compromise admissible
games.
3 Compromise solutions based on bankruptcy
This sections introduces a new class of solutions for compromise admissible
games based on bankruptcy rules. Furthermore, we take a dual approach
and show that for solutions based on self-dual bankruptcy rules, the two
approaches coincide.
Bankruptcy rules can be extended to solutions on the class of compromise
admissible games in the following way. Let f : BRN ! RN be a bankruptcy
rule. Then the compromise extension of f, f¤, is deﬁned by







for all v 2 CAN. Note that because v 2 CAN, the bankruptcy situation to
which f is applied is well-deﬁned. Generally, if f is a bankruptcy rule and
4f¤ is its compromise extension, then f¤ will be eﬃcient (
P
i2N f¤
i (v) = v(N)
for all v 2 CAN). The following lemma shows that if f is homogeneous of
degree 1, then f¤ is relatively invariant with respect to strategic equivalence,
ie, f¤(kv + a) = kf¤(v) + a for all v 2 CAN, k > 0 and a 2 RN.
Lemma 3.1 If f(kE;kd) = k ¢ f(E;d) for all k > 0 and all (E;d) 2 BRN,
then f¤ is relatively invariant with respect to strategic equivalence.
Proof: Let v 2 CAN, k > 0 and a 2 RN. Deﬁne ˆ v = kv + a. Then
ˆ v 2 CAN, M(ˆ v) = kM(v) + a and m(ˆ v) = km(v) + a. From this, we have
f¤(ˆ v) = m(ˆ v) + f(ˆ v(N) ¡
X
i2N
mi(ˆ v);M(ˆ v) ¡ m(ˆ v))




= k(m(v) + f(v(N) ¡
X
i2N
mi(v);M(v) ¡ m(v))) + a
= kf¤(v) + a
Hence, f¤ is relatively invariant with respect to strategic equivalence. ¤
It is immediately clear that the compromise value (or ¿ value) introduced
by Tijs (1981) is the compromise extension of the proportional rule, since ¿ is
the eﬃcient convex combination of the vectors M(v) and m(v). Quant et al.
(2003) consider the compromise extension of the Talmud rule (cf. Aumann
and Maschler (1985)) for games for which the core cover coincides with
the core. They prove that for this speciﬁc class of games the compromise
extension of the Talmud rule equals the nucleolus. Gonz´ alez-D´ ıaz et al.
(2003) study the compromise extension of the adjusted proportional rule
(cf. Curiel et al. (1988)) and show that it coincides with the barycentre of
the edges of the core cover.
Another way to extend a bankruptcy rule to an allocation rule on CAN
is to take a dual approach. Instead of ﬁrst giving each player his minimum
right and then dividing what is left, one could ﬁrst give each player his utopia
demand and take back the excess amount using f. This dual extension of a
bankruptcy rule f, fF, is deﬁned by
fF(v) = M(v) ¡ f
¡X
i2N
Mi(v) ¡ v(N);M(v) ¡ m(v)
¢
for all v 2 CAN.
5The dual of a bankruptcy rule f (cf. Aumann and Maschler (1985)), ¯ f
is deﬁned by




and a rule is called self-dual if f = ¯ f.
As is stated in the following proposition, ﬁrst taking the dual of f and
then extending this rule yields the same solution as taking the dual extension
of f.
Proposition 3.1 Let f : BRN ! RN be a bankruptcy rule and let v 2
CAN. Then ¯ f¤(v) = fF(v).
Proof: Applying the deﬁnitions yields




























As a corollary, we obtain that if f is self-dual, then fF = f¤.
4 Run-to-the-bank rule
In this section we consider the compromise extension of the run-to-the-bank
rule. We provide an interpretation in terms of larginals.


















6Example 4.1 Let v 2 CAN with N = f1;2;3g be the game deﬁned by
S f1g f2g f3g f1;2g f1;3g f2;3g N
v(S) 0 0 0 3 2 4 6
Then M(v) = (2;4;3) and m(v) = (0;1;0). The larginals are given in the
table below.
¾ 123 132 213 231 312 321
`¾(v) (2;4;0) (2;1;3) (2;4;0) (0;4;2) (2;1;3) (0;3;3)
The RTB¤ solution equals














Note that the RTB¤ solution coincides with the average of the larginals. /
The RTB¤ solution is similar to the Shapley value in the sense that it is
the average of all larginals (rather than marginals)1. This is shown in the
following theorem.




Proof: Consider the game w deﬁned by w(S) = v(S) ¡
P
i2S mi(v) for
all S ½ N. Then w 2 CAN and `¾(w) = `¾(v) ¡ m(v) for all ¾ 2 Π(N),























As a result of Lemma 3.1, RTB¤ is relatively invariant with respect to strate-
gic equivalence and hence,


















1Note however that larginals do not satisfy additivity, since the minimum right vector
m is not additive.
75 A recursive formula of RTB¤
In this section we give a characterisation of RTB¤ by means of a recursive
formula, which is based on O’Neill’s consistency property.
The RTB rule is the unique bankruptcy rule satisfying the following










for all (E;d) 2 BRN and all i 2 N.2
To extend this recursive expression to our framework of compromise
admissible games, we have to deﬁne a subclass which is closed with respect to
“sending one player away with his claim”. For this, we need a nonnegativity
condition (which is harmless as a result of relative invariance with respect
to strategic equivalence) and a weak version of superadditivity. The class
AN ½ CAN consists of all TU games v 2 CAN such that for all S ½ N,
(i) v(S) ¸ 0,
(ii) v(S) +
P
k2NnS mk(v) · v(N).
We denote A =
S
N AN.
We are going to characterise RTB¤ on A using the following extension
of O’Neill’s consistency property to a solution f on A: for all N, all v 2 AN




















where the game vj 2 TUNnfjg is deﬁned by




for all S ½ Nnfjg, j 2 Nnfig.
The game vj is again an element of A, as is shown in the following
lemma.
2O’Neill calls this property consistency, which is not to be confused with various other
notions of consistency.
8Lemma 5.1 Let v 2 AN and j 2 N. Then vj 2 ANnfjg.
Proof: It is immediately clear from the deﬁnition of vj(S) that vj(S) ¸ 0
for all S ½ Nnfjg, so vj satisﬁes (i). We ﬁrst show that we can restrict
ourselves to the case that vj(Nnfjg) > 0.
It follows from condition (ii) applied to (N;v) that for all S ½ Nnfjg
we have
v(S [ fjg) ¡
X
i2S




from which it easily follows that
vj(S) · vj(Nnfjg): (2)
Hence, if vj(Nnfjg = 0, then vj(S) = 0 for all S ½ Nnfjg and vj 2 ANnfjg
follows trivially. So, assume that vj(Nnfjg) > 0. It remains to prove that
vj satisﬁes condition (ii) and that vj 2 CANnfjg.
Step 1: In order to show that vj satisﬁes (ii), we calculate M(vj) and m(vj).
Let i 2 N. If vj(Nnfi;jg) = 0, then Mi(vj) = vj(Nnfjg). Otherwise,
Mi(vj) = vj(Nnfjg) ¡ vj(Nnfi;jg)
= v(N) ¡ v(Nnfig) ¡ mi(v) = Mi(v) ¡ mi(v):






We next show that mi(vj) = 0. To do so, we prove that for each S ½
Nnfjg and i 2 S we have
½S
i · 0; (3)
where ½S
i = vj(S) ¡
P
k2Snfig Mk(vj). Since mi(vj) ¸ vj(fig) ¸ 0 this
proves that mi(vj) = 0.
Let S ½ Nnfjg;i 2 S. If vj(S) = 0, then (3) follows from the fact that
Mk(vj) ¸ 0 for all k 2 Nnfjg. Assume that vj(S) > 0. We consider two
cases.
9Case 1: Mk(vj) = Mk(v) ¡ mk(v) for all k 2 Snfig. Then
½S






= v(S [ fjg) ¡
X
k2S






= v(S [ fjg) ¡
X
k2S[fjgnfig
Mk(v) ¡ mi(v) · 0;
where the inequality follows from the deﬁnition of mi(v).
Case 2: There exists a k 2 Snfig with Mk(vj) = vj(Nnfjg). Then
½S




because of (2) and M`(vj) ¸ 0 for all ` 2 Nnfjg.
Hence, ½S
i · 0 for all S ½ Nnfjg;i 2 S and m(vj) = 0. Condition (ii)
then directly follows from (2).
Step 2: We next show that vj 2 CAN. We already have m(vj) = 0 · M(vj)
and
P











k ¡ Mk(vj) · 0:
Hence, vj 2 CANnfjg.
Because vj also satisfy (i) and (ii), we have vj 2 ANnfjg. ¤
The following theorem characterises RTB¤ on A.
Theorem 5.1 RTB¤ is the unique solution on A satisfying (1).
Proof: Let f be a solution on A satisfying (1). Then this uniquely deter-
mines the outcome of f for all one-player games and, by induction, for all
games in A. Therefore, there can only be one rule that satisﬁes (1) on A.
Hence, it suﬃces to show that RTB¤ satisﬁes (1) on A.
10Let v 2 AN. From (O’Neill) consistency of RTB it follows that for all
i 2 N we have
RTB¤
























and d¡j = M¡j¡m¡j = (Mk(v)¡mk(v))k2Nnfjg. Note that by construction























Since (M¡j ¡ m¡j)k ¸ minfvj(Nnfjg);M¡j ¡ m¡j)g = Mk(vj) for all
k 2 Nnfjg, the truncation property (ie, for all (E;d) 2 BRN, RTB(E;d) =
RTB(E;d0) with d0










































where the last equality is true, because m(vj) = 0 for all j 2 N. Hence,
RTB¤ satisﬁes (1). ¤
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